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ABSTRACT 
We analyze the manipulability of competitive equilibrium allocation rules for the 
simplest many-to-many extension of Shapley and Shubik’s (1972) assignment game. 
First, we show that if an agent has a quota of one, then she does not have an incentive to 
manipulate any competitive equilibrium rule that gives her her most preferred 
competitive equilibrium payoff when she reports truthfully. In particular, this result 
extends to the one-to-many (respectively, many-to-one) models the Non-Manipulability 
Theorem of the buyers (respectively, sellers), proven by Demange (1982), Leonard 
(1983), and Demange and Gale (1985) for the assignment game. Second, we prove a 
“General Manipulability Theorem” that implies and generalizes two “folk theorems” for 
the assignment game, the Manipulability Theorem and the General Impossibility 
Theorem, never proven before. For the one-to-one case, this result provides a sort of 
converse of the Non-Manipulability Theorem. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
We study two-sided matching markets where a finite number of sellers (or 
workers) meet a finite number of buyers (or firms). Each seller owns and is willing to 
sell a set of objects, and each buyer wants to buy several objects, up to her quota, from 
various sellers. Both types of agents derive utility from money and objects, and their 
utility functions are additively separable. The objects sold by each particular seller are 
identical, but sellers are heterogeneous, in the sense that the sellers’ object types are 
different from a buyer’s point of view. Buyers are also heterogeneous in terms of 
preferences because a buyer’s willingness to pay for an object may be different from 
that of another buyer. 
The many-to-many two-sided matching model that we analyze was proposed and 
studied in Sotomayor (1992), (1999), (2007) and it was called the multiple-partners 
assignment game. It is the simplest generalization of the assignment game (Shapley and 
Shubik 1972), a model where each seller owns and is willing to sell only one object, and 
each buyer wants to buy one object at most.4 
We call our market the buyer-seller market. Roughly speaking, a competitive 
equilibrium in a buyer-seller market is a vector of prices, one for each object, and an 
allocation of objects to buyers such that the demand of every buyer is satisfied, the 
number of a seller’s objects allocated is not larger than his supply and the prices of 
unsold objects are their valuation for the sellers. The set of equilibrium prices is non-
empty and is a complete lattice whose extreme points are the minimum and the 
maximum equilibrium prices, which are called buyer-optimal and seller-optimal 
equilibrium prices, respectively.5, 6 
Given a set of buyers and sellers with their respective quotas, a competitive 
equilibrium rule is a function that selects a unique competitive equilibrium allocation 
for every market. When a competitive equilibrium rule is adopted, information about the 
valuation of the agents is required. Therefore, the rule induces a strategic game. In this 
                                                            
4 Crawford and Knoer (1981) studied the linear model where the utility of the seller depends on the 
identity of the buyer. Kelso and Crawford (1982) extended the analysis to many-to-one matching models. 
5 The competitive one-to-one market was proposed in Gale (1960), who proved the existence of 
equilibrium prices in this market. Shapley and Shubik (1972) showed that the set of equilibrium prices 
form a complete lattice whose extreme points are the minimum and the maximum equilibrium prices. 
Sotomayor (2007) introduced the concept of a competitive equilibrium payoff for the multiple-partners 
assignment game and extended the previous results for this environment. She also proved that the set of 
competitive equilibrium payoffs is a subset of the set of stable payoffs and may be smaller than this set. 
6 Our results are established for the competitive market game. For the assignment game, they can easily 
be transferred to the cooperative model because the core coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium 
payoffs (Shapley and Shubik 1972). 
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paper, we study the agents’ incentives to report truthfully when a competitive 
equilibrium rule is used. 
The first important result in the literature concerning agents’ incentives is the Non-
Manipulability Theorem for the assignment game, proposed by Demange (1982) and 
Leonard (1983). These authors proved that if the buyer-optimal (or seller-optimal) 
competitive equilibrium rule is used, then no buyer (or seller) can profit by misstating 
her (or his) true valuations.7  
The room for manipulation is large for agents who can buy or sell several objects 
and we show that the Non-Manipulability Theorem does not extend to the (many-to-
many) buyer-seller markets. However, we prove that an agent with a quota of one never 
has an incentive to manipulate any competitive equilibrium rule that yields her/his most 
preferred competitive equilibrium payoff when s/he reports truthfully. Moreover, we 
show that the buyer-optimal (respectively, seller-optimal) competitive equilibrium rule 
for a one-to-many (respectively, many-to-one) buyer-seller market is not only individual 
strategy-proof but also group strategy-proof for the buyers (respectively, sellers).  
The second important result in the literature is the Impossibility Theorem (Roth and 
Sotomayor, 1990). It provides an assignment game with one seller and n > 1 buyers 
where, under any competitive equilibrium rule, there is an agent who has an incentive to 
misrepresent her/his valuation. Demange and Gale (1985) presented several examples of 
assignment markets where a competitive equilibrium rule that yields the optimal 
competitive equilibrium for one side of the market provides incentives to an agent 
belonging to the other side to misrepresent her/his valuation. The main feature of all the 
examples is that the markets have more than one vector of equilibrium prices. 
It was believed that the phenomena observed in the previous examples can extend 
to any assignment market with more than one vector of equilibrium prices. Along the 
years, this belief has supported two “folk theorems” for the assignment game, which 
have never been proven in the literature. For the more general buyer-seller markets that 
we analyze, the two theorems can be expressed as follows. The Manipulability Theorem 
states that if the buyer-optimal (respectively, seller-optimal) competitive equilibrium 
rule is used in a market with more than one vector of equilibrium prices, then there is a 
                                                            
7 Demange and Gale (1985) extended the Non-Manipulability Theorem to a one-to-one buyer-seller 
model where the utilities are continuous in money, but are not necessarily linear. They also extended it to 
any competitive equilibrium rule that maps the market defined by the true valuations to the buyer-optimal 
(or seller-optimal) competitive equilibrium for this market. Under the assumption that there are no 
monetary transfers between buyers (respectively, sellers), these authors proved that such a rule is 
collectively non-manipulable by the buyers (respectively, sellers).  
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seller (respectively, buyer) who can profitably misrepresent his (respectively, her) 
valuations. The General Impossibility Theorem asserts that if a market has more than 
one vector of equilibrium prices, then every competitive equilibrium rule can be 
manipulated by some agent. 
We provide the proofs and formal statements of the two theorems, extended to the 
many-to-many buyer-seller market, aiming to fill this gap in the literature. Indeed, we 
give a simple proof of a stronger and more General Manipulability Theorem: Any agent 
who does not receive her/his optimal competitive equilibrium payoff under a 
competitive rule can profitably misrepresent her/his valuations, assuming the others tell 
the truth.  
Our theorems allow the following necessary and sufficient condition to be stated: 
an agent with a quota of one cannot manipulate a rule in a market if and only if the rule 
gives to her/him her/his most preferred equilibrium payoff. In particular, for the 
assignment game, if a competitive equilibrium rule is strategy-proof for the buyers 
(respectively, sellers), then the rule maps the profile of true valuations to the buyer-
optimal (respectively, seller-optimal) competitive equilibrium price. This result is 
mathematically unusual because it provides a way of concluding that a competitive 
equilibrium rule is, for example, strategy-proof for the buyers, based only on the direct 
examination of the agents’ payoffs obtained by the profile of true valuations.  
Miyake (1998) considers the buyer-optimal mechanism in the assignment game as 
a multi-item generalization of Vickrey’s second price auction. In a framework where the 
sellers’ valuations are fixed and known, he shows that the honest strategy profile is not 
a Nash equilibrium for the buyers, for any competitive equilibrium rule other than the 
buyer-optimal one. We strengthen Miyake’s (1998) result because we also take into 
account the sellers’ incentives and extend the result to many-to-many markets. Also, we 
provide a simpler proof. In a general one-to-many buyer-seller model with (a finite set 
of) contracts, Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) show that the buyer-optimal competitive 
equilibrium is strategy-proof for the buyers and Sakai (2011) shows that it is the unique 
equilibrium rule that is strategy-proof for the buyers. 
Demange and Gale (1985) consider the strategic equilibrium of the game induced 
by the buyer-optimal competitive equilibrium rule if the buyers play their sincere 
strategies and the sellers can only manipulate their valuations. Sotomayor (2000) 
analyzes the case in which the rule produces a competitive equilibrium payoff and there 
is no restriction on the strategies selected by the agents. Related results are proven for 
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the marriage market in Roth and Sotomayor (1990). Sotomayor (2012) proves a 
manipulability theorem and an impossibility theorem for the college admission market.8  
Several authors have studied the manipulability of envy-free allocation rules in fair 
allocation models, where a finite number of bundles are assigned to a finite number of 
agents. Although the notions of equilibrium in the assignment game and envy-free in 
the fair allocation models are different (in particular, there are no sellers in the second 
model), the agents’ incentives to manipulate are similar to those of the buyers in the 
assignment game. Sun and Yang (2003), Andersson and Svensson (2008), and Svensson 
(2009) characterize the set of envy-free and coalitionally strategy-proof allocation rules 
when a bundle of objects and a limited budget have to be distributed among agents. Any 
such rule fixes a maximal compensation for each object, and as a function of the 
preferences reported by the agents, a “maximal” (in the sense that it distributes the 
largest amount of money) envy-free allocation is chosen respecting the fixed 
compensations for any object. Andersson, Ehlers, and Svensson (2014) and Fujinaka 
and Wakayama (2015) have independently found some properties concerning the 
manipulation of envy-free allocation rules in the one-to-one fair allocation model that 
have a similar flavor as the properties that we provide for equilibrium rules in the many-
to-many matching problem. In particular, they show a result in the same spirit as our 
General Manipulability Theorem: any individual can manipulate an envy-free allocation 
rule if it does not guarantee him the best outcome in the set of envy-free allocations. 
Finally, the concern about buyers’ manipulation of their true willingness to pay is 
also present in the auction literature. In the English auction, which leads to the 
minimum equilibrium prices, buyers do not have an incentive to misrepresent their 
preferences when they all have a unit demand (Leonard 1983; Demange, Gale, and 
Sotomayor 1986), or all the units auctioned are homogeneous and buyers have 
decreasing marginal utilities (Ausubel 2004). On the other hand, Gul and Stacchetti 
(2000), building on the work of Kelso and Crawford (1982), provide a generalization of 
the English auction to situations where each buyer may wish to acquire several 
heterogeneous objects (and their preferences satisfy the gross substitutes condition). 
They show that a truthful revelation of preferences cannot be guaranteed in general.9 
                                                            
8 For some analyses of the consequences of manipulation in the marriage and the college admission 
models, see Roth (1985), Kojima and Pathak (2009), Ma (2010), and Jaramillo, Kayi, and Klijn (2013). 
9 Se also some more recent papers on dynamic auctions for multiple heterogeneous items (Ausubel 2006; 
Sun and Yang 2014). They consider bidders who can demand multiple heterogeneous items and have a 
general utility function over bundles (not necessarily separable or additive). They develop dynamic 
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2-THE FRAMEWORK AND PRELIMINARIES 
A market  M  involves two finite and disjoint sets of agents,  B  and  S, which can 
be thought of as being buyers and sellers, respectively. Set  B  has  m  buyers and set  S  
has  n  sellers. Each seller  sk  owns  t(sk)  identical objects, and we also denote  sk  the 
type of the objects owned by that seller. Each buyer  bj  has a quota  t(bj), representing 
the maximum number of objects she is allowed to acquire. No buyer is interested in 
acquiring more than one item from a given seller. We denote by  tB  and  tS  the array of 
numbers  t(bj)’s  and  t(sk)’s, respectively.10 
The value of an object  sk  is  rk  0  for seller  sk  and  ajk  0  for buyer  bj. The 
value  ajk  does not depend on the other objects that buyer  bj  acquires or on the other 
buyers acquiring objects of type  sk. Thus, if buyer  bj  purchases an object  sk  at price  
pk  rk, then her individual payoff in this transaction is  ujk = ajk  pk  and that of seller  
sk  is  vjk = pk  rk. We denote by  aj  the vector of the values of ajk’s; the valuation 
matrix of the buyers and the valuation vector of the sellers are denoted by  a  and  r,  
respectively. A trade is acceptable to seller  sk  and buyer  bj  if the potential gain from 
the trade between the two agents is non-negative, that is,  ajk  rk  0. 
For notational simplicity, the set  B  includes a dummy buyer  b0  and the set  S  
includes a dummy seller  s0  who owns “dummy objects”  s0  whose valuation and price 
is zero, that is,  r0 = p0 = 0. The valuations of the dummy object are  aj0 = 0  and the 
dummy buyer’s valuations are  a0k = rk  for all  bj  B  and  sk  S. The quotas of the 
dummy agents are enough to guaranty that the real agents in the market can buy from, 
or sell to them as many objects as they need.  
A feasible matching assigns each object to one buyer (possibly the dummy buyer) 
so that each non-dummy buyer  bj  is assigned to an admissible set of objects for her, 
that is, a set with  t(bj)  objects that contains at most one object of the same seller 
(although it may include several dummy objects). If a seller’s object is assigned to a 
                                                                                                                                                                              
auctions that are efficient and strategy-proof in the sense that sincere bidding by every bidder is an ex 
post perfect Nash equilibrium in the game. 
10 The situation where there is no restriction on the number of objects a buyer can acquire is a particular 
case of our model, by making the quota of every buyer equal to the total number of objects. However, the 
quota makes sense in many situations. Consider, for example, a market with three sellers,  s1,  s2  and  s3. 
Seller  sk  owns a number of cars of type  k,  for k = 1, 2, 3. Suppose that buyer  bj  has in hand an offer 
from a client who will purchase two cars, at most, of different types at the price of  ajk  for  k = 1, 2, 3,   
should he obtain them in the market.  Since buyer  bj  knows that he can earn  ajk  by reselling the car of 
type  k, he will not buy at a higher price. And his quota is obviously  2. 
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buyer, we say that both agents are matched. If an object is allocated to the dummy 
buyer, we say that it is left unsold. Formally,11 
 
Definition 2.1. A matching for  M  is identified with a matrix  x = (xjk)  of non-negative 
numbers, defined for all pairs  (bj, sk)  BxS  such that  xjk  {0, 1}  if bj  Bb0  and   
sk  Ss0. Under this identification,  xjk > 0  if and only if  bj  and  sk  are matched to 
each other. A matching  x  for  M  is feasible if it satisfies (i)  B xjk = t(sk)  for all          
sk  Ss0, (ii)  S xjk = t(bj)  for all  bj  Bb0  and (iii)  ajk  rk  0  if  xjk = 1. 
 
Given a feasible matching  x, we denote by  C(bj, x)  the set of objects allocated to  
bj  at  x  and by  C(sk, x)  the set of buyers assigned to  sk  at  x. Also, we denote  a(a, r)jk 
 ajk  rk  if  ajk  rk  0  and  a(a, r)jk  0  otherwise.  
A feasible matching that maximizes total returns, in the sense that it generates the 
maximum surplus in the market  M, is called an optimal matching.  
 
Definition 2.2. A matching  x  for  M  is optimal if (i) it is feasible and                            
(ii)  BxS a(a, r)jk xjk   BxS a(a, r)jk x´jk  for all feasible matchings  x´. 
 
A feasible price vector  p  for market  M  is a function of  S  to  R  (the set of real 
numbers) that associates a price  pk  rk  to each  sk  S  (with  p0 = r0 = 0). A feasible 
allocation for  M  is a pair  (p, x), where  p  is a feasible price vector and  x  is a feasible 
matching.  
The value of an admissible set of objects  S’  to buyer  bj  is the sum of the values of 
the objects in  S’  to her, and similarly for any seller  sk. Thus, given the feasible 
allocation  (p, x), the arrays of  bj’s  individual payoffs  ujk’s, defined for all                     
sk  C(bj, x), and the corresponding  sk’s  individual payoffs  vjk’s, with  bj  C(sk, x), 
determine a feasible payoff vector  (u, v)  and  (u, v; x)  is called a feasible outcome. We 
say that  x  is compatible with  (u, v). Given a feasible outcome (u, v; x), we denote  
mink{ujk}  and  minj{vjk}  the smallest individual payoff of buyer  bj  and seller  sk, 
respectively:  mink{ujk} = Min {ujk; sk  C(bj, x)},  minj{vjk} = Min {vjk; bj  C(sk, x)}.12 
                                                            
11 For any set  A  BS, we use the notation  A  for the sum over all elements in  A. 
12 mink{ujk}  and  minj{vjk}  can depend on the maching  x. However, as shown in Sotomayor (1992), 
(1999), they are independent of the matching for competitive equilibrium outcomes. For notational 
simplicity, we do not include a reference to the matching  x  in the expressions  mink{ujk}  and  minj{vjk}. 
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Then, given a price vector  p, buyer  bj  B  has preferences over the admissible 
sets of objects that are completely described by the numbers  ajk’s: For any two 
admissible sets of objects  S’  and  S”, buyer  bj  prefers  S’  to  S”  at prices  p  if         
∑S’ (ajk  pk) > ∑S” (ajk  pk). She is indifferent between these sets if  ∑S’ (ajk  pk) =      
∑S” (ajk  pk). We denote by  D(bj, p)  the set of admissible sets of objects that buyer  bj  
most prefers at a given feasible price vector p and we call it the demand set of buyer  bj  
at  p. In this context,  D(bj, p) ≠   for all  bj  B. Also, if  S’  D(bj, p)  and  sk  S’, 
then  ajk  pk  0,  so the trade is acceptable to  sk  and  bj. 
A competitive equilibrium is a feasible price vector for the objects plus an 
allocation of each buyer to an admissible set of objects belonging to her demand set that 
respects the quotas of the sellers. Moreover, in a competitive equilibrium, the price of 
each unsold object is its value for his owner. Formally, 
 
Definition 2.3. A competitive equilibrium for  M  is a feasible allocation  (p, x)  such 
that (i)  C(bj, x)  D(bj, p)  for all  bj  B; (ii) if object  sk  is left unsold, then  pk = rk. 
 
If the allocation  (p, x)  is a competitive equilibrium, we say that  p  is an 
equilibrium price vector,  x  is a competitive matching, and  x  is compatible with  p  and 
vice-versa. The outcome  (u, v; x)  corresponding to  (p, x)  is called a competitive 
equilibrium outcome and  (u, v)  is called a competitive equilibrium payoff compatible 
with  x. Sotomayor (1992 and 1999) has shown that every competitive matching is 
optimal and that every optimal matching is compatible with any competitive 
equilibrium payoff. These results imply, in particular, that all competitive equilibria are 
Pareto optimal. 
The next proposition, whose proof is immediate, provides an alternative 
characterization of competitive equilibria. It implies, in particular, that every seller sells 
all of his items for the same price 
 
Proposition 2.1. The outcome  (u, v; x)  is a competitive equilibrium for  M  if and only 
if it is feasible and (i) vjk = minj{vjk}  for all  bj  C(sk, x), (ii) mink{ujk} + minj{vjk}  ajk 
 rk  for all pairs  (bj, sk)  with  xjk = 0  and (iii)  mink{ujk}  0  and  minj{vjk}  0  for all  
bj  B  and  sk  S. 
 
Sotomayor (2007) proves that the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs is a 
complete lattice, under the partial order relation defined by the preferences of the 
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sellers. Moreover, there is a conflict of interests between buyers and sellers with respect 
to two comparable competitive equilibrium payoffs. Thus, two particularly interesting 
outcomes in the set of competitive equilibrium outcomes exist: 
 
Definition 2.4 A competitive equilibrium payoff is called a buyer-optimal competitive 
equilibrium payoff if every buyer weakly prefers it to any other competitive equilibrium 
payoff. We define a seller-optimal competitive equilibrium payoff similarly. 
 
The unique competitive price vector corresponding to the buyer-optimal 
(respectively, seller-optimal) competitive equilibrium payoff is smaller (respectively, 
larger) in each component than any other competitive price vector. It is called the 
minimum competitive price vector (respectively, maximum competitive price vector) and 
we denote it by  p   (respectively,  p ). Also, we let  (u , p   r)  and  (u , p   r)  be the 
buyer-optimal and the seller-optimal competitive equilibrium payoffs. 
 
3. COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM RULES 
For a given set of agents and arrays of quotas  (B, S, tB, tS), a competitive 
equilibrium rule is a function that selects a unique competitive equilibrium allocation 
for every market, that is, for every possible valuation matrix for the buyers  a  and 
valuation vector for the sellers  r. We denote the market by  M(a, r). For each such 
market, the competitive equilibrium rule selects an equilibrium price vector  П(a, r)  and 
a competitive matching  X(a, r). Hence, we denote the competitive equilibrium rule by  
(П, X)  and the competitive equilibrium selected by the rule when it is applied to      
M(a, r)  by  (П(a, r), X(a, r)). The corresponding buyers’ and sellers’ payoff vectors are 
denoted by  u(a, r) and  v(a, r). Then, for all  (bj, sk)  BxS,  u(a, r)jk = ajk  П(a, r)k  and  
v(a, r)jk =  П(a, r)k  rk  if  X(a, r)jk > 0. 
If the competitive equilibrium rule  (П, X)  produces the buyer-optimal 
(respectively, seller-optimal) competitive equilibrium for every  M(a, r), the rule is 
called the buyer-optimal (respectively, seller-optimal) competitive equilibrium rule. 
When a competitive equilibrium rule  (П, X)  is adopted in a market  M(a, r)  and 
the agents are requested to report their valuations, then the rule induces a strategic game  
(П, X, a, r), where the set of players is the set of agents  BS; the profile of valuations 
is given by  (a, r); the set of strategies for buyer  bj  Bb0  is the set of vectors            
a’j  Rm+, with a’0 = 0; the set of strategies for seller  sk  Ss0  is the set of numbers    
r’k  0, with  r’0 = 0; and the outcome function applied to the profile of strategies        
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(a’, r’)  is given by  (П(a’, r’), X(a’, r’)). We say that the game  (П, X, a, r)  is the 
strategic game induced by  (П, X)  in market  M(a, r). The preferences of the players are 
determined by their true valuations  (a, r).13 Thus, the true individual payoffs in the 
transaction between buyer  bj  and seller  sk  at allocation  (П(a’, r’), X(a’, r’))  are: 
Ujk(П(a’, r’), X(a’, r’); a, r) = ajk  Пk(a’, r’)  if  X(a’, r’)jk = 1  and  sk ≠ s0, 
Ujk(П(a’, r’), X(a’, r’); a, r) = 0  if  X(a’, r’)jk = 1  and  sk = s0, 
Vjk(П(a’, r’), X(a’, r’); a, r) = Пk(a’, r’)  rk  if  X(a’, r’)jk = 1  and  bj ≠ b0  and 
Vjk(П(a’, r’), X(a’, r’); a, r) = 0  if  X(a’, r’)jk = 1  and  bj = b0. 
Therefore, buyer  bj  prefers allocation  (П(a’, r’), X(a’, r’))  to allocation          
(П(a, r), X(a, r))  if 
∑C(bj, X(a’, r’)) Ujk(П(a’, r’), X(a’, r’); a, r) > ∑C(bj, X(a, r)) Ujk(П(a, r), X(a, r); a, r) 
and seller  sk  prefers allocation  (П(a’, r’), X(a’, r’))  to allocation  (П(a, r), X(a, r))  if 
∑C(sk, X(a, r)) Vjk(П(a’, r’), X(a’, r’); a, r) > t(sk) (Пk(a, r)  rk). 
 
Definition 3.1. Agent  y  (Bb0)(Ss0)  can manipulate the competitive equilibrium 
rule  (П, X)  in the market  M(a, r)  if there is a profile of valuations  (a’, r’), which 
differs from  (a, r)  only in agent  y’s valuations, such that agent  y  is better off at 
allocation  (П(a’, r’), X(a’, r’))  than at allocation  (П(a, r), X(a, r)). 
 
We say that a competitive equilibrium rule is strategy-proof for the buyers 
(respectively, strategy-proof for the sellers) if there is no buyer (respectively, seller) 
who can manipulate the rule in any market. 
 
4. THE NON-MANIPULABILITY THEOREMS 
According to the Non-Manipulability Theorem for the assignment game (Demange 
1982; Leonard 1983),14 the buyer-optimal (respectively, seller-optimal) competitive 
equilibrium rule is strategy-proof for the buyers (respectively, sellers). In this section, 
we use examples to show that this theorem does not extend to the many-to-many 
market. On the other hand, we prove that no seller can manipulate the seller-optimal 
competitive equilibrium rule in markets where each seller only has one object to sell, 
even though the buyers may want to acquire more than one object; and similarly for the 
buyers. Indeed, we prove a stronger result that asserts that no group of agents with a 
                                                            
13 We will use “primes” to denote reported variables. For example,  a  is the true valuation matrix of the 
buyers, whereas  a’  is the reported valuation matrix of the buyers. 
14 See also Demange and Gale (1985).  
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quota of one can manipulate a rule that gives them their most-preferred competitive 
equilibrium payoff. 
Example 4.1 illustrates a situation in which the seller-optimal competitive 
equilibrium rule is manipulated by a seller who does not sell all his objects following 
manipulation. We will show that this feature of our example is key. 
 
Example 4.1. Consider the market  M(a, r), where  B = {b1, b2, b0},  S = {s1, s0},         
a11 = 3,  a21 = 1,  t(b1) = t(b2) = 1,  t(s1) = 2,  and  r1 = 0. At the seller-optimal 
competitive equilibrium allocation, seller  s1  sells his two objects at a price of  1, so his 
total payoff is  2. However, if he misrepresents his valuation and reports  r’1 = 2.5  then, 
at any competitive equilibrium allocation for  M(a, r’), he only sells one object, to buyer  
b1, and obtains a true payoff of  2.5.  Therefore,  s1  can manipulate the seller-optimal 
competitive equilibrium rule. 
 
Similarly, Example 4.2 shows that there are markets where the buyers may have 
incentives not to report their true valuations if the buyer-optimal competitive 
equilibrium rule is applied. 
 
Example 4.2. Consider the market  M(a, r)  with  B = {b1, b2, b0},  S = {s1, s2, s3, s0},  
a1 = (7, 6, 4, 0),  a2 = (8, 6, 3, 0),  r1 = r2 = r3 = 0, t(b1) = 2  and  t(b2) = t(s1) = t(s2) = 
t(s3) = 1. Under the buyer-optimal competitive equilibrium, buyer  b1  is matched to  s2  
and  s3  and she receives individual payoffs of  5  and  4  from these transactions, 
whereas buyer  b2  is matched to  s1  and receives a payoff of  5. But if buyer  b1  reports 
a1’ = (7, 6, 7, 0)  then, under the new buyer-optimal competitive equilibrium,  b1  pays  
0  to sellers  s2  and  s3. Hence, she gets  6  and  4  under her true individual payoffs 
instead of  5  and  4 and she has an incentive to misrepresent her valuations. 
 
In Example 4.2, buyer  b1  can manipulate the rule because she buys two objects 
and she can influence the price of one of the objects (s2) by reporting a different 
valuation for some other object (s3). We will show that a buyer with a quota of one does 
not have an incentive to manipulate any competitive equilibrium rule in a market where 
she obtains her most-preferred competitive equilibrium payoff; in particular, she never 
has an incentive to manipulate the buyer-optimal competitive equilibrium rule. 
Theorem 4.1 states a general non-manipulability result. It considers deviations by 
groups of buyers and sellers. It asserts that if a group of agents with a quota of one 
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misrepresents their valuation then at least one of the agents would be as well-off under 
her/his most preferred competitive equilibrium outcome for the true market than in the 
outcome selected by the rule for the reported market. 
 
Theorem 4.1. Consider a market  M(a, r)  and a vector of reported valuations  (a’, r’). 
Let  B’S’  be the set of agents who misrepresent their valuations, where  B’  B,         
S’  S, and suppose that  t(bj) = 1  and  t(sk) = 1  for all  bj  B’  and all  sk  S’. Let  
(u’, v’; x’)  be any competitive equilibrium outcome for the market  M(a’, r’)  and       
(U, V; x’)  the true outcome under  (u’, v’; x’). Then, there exists a competitive 
equilibrium outcome  (u, v; x)  for  M(a, s)  such that either  k ujk   k Ujk  for at least 
one  bj  B’  or  j vjk   j Vjk  for at least one  sk  S’.   
Proof. The proof of Theorem 4.1 requires some preliminaries. 
Consider  M(a) M(a, r), where  ajk = max{ajk  rk, 0}  for all  (bj, sk)  BxS. We 
define a market related to  M(a)  in which each buyer  bj  (resp., each seller  sk) with a 
quota  t(bj)  (resp.,  t(sk)) is “replicated”  t(bj)  (resp.,  t(sk)) times so that each non-
dummy agent has a quota of one in the new market. We denote  bj(q)  (resp.,  sk(h)) the       
q-th (resp., h-th) copy of  bj  (resp.,  sk),  B#  {bj(1), bj(2),…, bj(t(bj)); bj  Bb0}{b0}  
and  S#  {sk(1),…, sk(t(sk)); sk  Ss0}{s0}. Also, let  t(bj(q)) = 1  and  t(sk(h)) = 1  for all  
bj(q)  B#b0  and  sk(h)  S#s0. 
In the proof, we use the following simplification. If some agent, say buyer  bj, has a 
quota of one, then we will identify her individual payoff  ujk  under  (u, v)  with her 
array of individual payoffs  uj = {ujk}, and we will refer to  uj  as  bj’s payoff  under       
(u, v).  
For each feasible matching  x  for the market  M(a), Definition 4.1 proposes a 
related feasible matching  x#  for the market where the players are  B#  and  S#. The 
idea is to define a matching  x#  such that if a buyer  bj  buys  sk  at  x, then one (and 
only one) copy of  bj,  say  bj(q), buys one copy of  sk, say  sk(h), under  x#. Moreover, no 
other pair in  B#xS#  can enter a partnership at  x#, that is, if  bj  does not buy  sk  at  x, 
then no copy of  bj  buys any copy of  sk at  x#. 
Definition 4.1. Let  x  be a feasible matching for  B  and  S. The x-related matching  x#  
for  B#  and  S#  is defined as the matching that satisfies the following conditions: 
(i) if  xjk = 1  then  q,h x#j(q)k(h) = 1; 
(ii) if  xjk = 0  then  q,h x#j(q)k(h) = 0; 
(iii) B# x#j(q)k(h) = 1  for all  sk(h)  S#  and  S# x#j(q)k(h) = 1  for all  bj(q)  B#. 
13 
 
For each pair  (a, x), where  x  is an optimal matching for  M(a), we define the  
|B#|x|S#|-matrix  a#  by 
a#j(q)k(h) = 0  if  xjk = 1  but  x#j(q)k(h) = 0;  a#j(q)k(h) = ajk  otherwise.  
The functional relation defined above is denoted by  (a, x)  and the related market 
is  M(a#). Clearly,  x#  is an optimal matching for  M(a#). 
The following Key lemma is due to Sotomayor (1992). 
Lemma 4.1 (Key Lemma). Let  x  be an optimal matching for  M(a). Let  x#  be the     
x-related matching  and  a# = (a, x). Consider a feasible matching  x’  for  M(a). Then 
there exists a feasible matching  x’#   for  M(a#)  such that 
(i) if  x’jk = 1  then: 
 (ia) q,h x’#j(q)k(h) = 1; 
 (ib) for the replicas  (j(q), k(h))  for which  x’#j(q)k(h) = 1  it holds that   
        a#j(q)k(h) = ajk; 
 (ic) if additionally  xjk = 1  then  x’#j(q)k(h) = 1  if and only if  x#j(q)k(h) = 1; 
(ii) if x’jk = 0  then  q,h x’#j(q)k(h) = 0; 
(iii) B# x’#j(q)k(h) = 1  for all  sk(h)  S#  and  S# x’#j(q)k(h) = 1  for all  bj(q)  B#.  
The matching  x’#  defined in Lemma 4.1 is an x’-related matching. It can be easily 
shown that  x’  is optimal for  M(a)  if and only if  x’#  is optimal for  M(a#). 
The connection between the feasible outcomes and the competitive equilibrium 
outcomes for  M(a#)  and  M(a)  is given by Lemma 4.2. below. (The proofs of the 
lemmas are in the Appendix.) 
Lemma 4.2. Let  x  be an optimal matching for  M(a),  x#  the matching obtained from  
x  by Definition 4.1, and  a# = (a, x). Also, let  x’  be a feasible matching for  M(a)  
and  x’#  the x’-related matching defined by the Key Lemma. Consider the outcome     
(u’, v’; x’)  for  M(a)  and the outcome  (u’#, v’#; x’#) for  M(a#)  and suppose that they 
satisfy the following relations: (1) for all pairs  (bj(q), sk(h))  B#xS#  such that  x’#j(q)k(h) 
= 1  then  u’#j(q) = u’jk  and  v’#k(h) = v’jk; (2) for all  bj(q)  B# (resp., sk(h)  S#) such 
that  x’#j(q)0 = 1  (resp.,  x’#0k(h)= 1) then  u’#j(q) = u’j0 = 0  (resp., v’#k(h) = v’0k = 0). 
Then, 
(i)  (u’, v’; x’)  is a feasible outcome for  M(a)  if and only if  (u’#, v’#; x’#)  is a 
feasible outcome for  M(a#); 
(ii) if  (u’, v’; x’)  is a competitive equilibrium outcome for  M(a), then              
(u’#, v’#; x’#)  is a competitive equilibrium outcome for  M(a#); 
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(iii) if  (u’#, v’#; x’#)  is a competitive equilibrium outcome for  M(a#)  and  
v’#k(1) = v’#k(2) =…= v’#k(t(sk))  for all  sk  S, then  (u’, v’; x’)  is  a competitive 
equilibrium outcome for  M(a). 
Lemma 4.2 does not relate the seller-optimal competitive equilibrium payoff of  
M(a#)  and the seller-optimal competitive equilibrium payoff of  M(a). Lemma 4.3 
states that the sellers with a quota of one have the same payoff in both outcomes. 
Lemma 4.3. Let  (u , v ; x)  be a seller-optimal competitive equilibrium outcome for  
M(a)  and  (u, v; x#)  be a seller-optimal competitive equilibrium outcome for  M(a#), 
where a# = (a, x). Then,  v k = vk  for all  sk  S  with  t(sk) = 1. 
Lemma 4.4 (Blocking Lemma). Let  (u, v; x)  be a feasible outcome for  M(a#)  and 
 B+  {bj(q)  B#; uj(q) > u+j(q)},  S+  {sk(h)  S#; vk(h) > v+k(h)}, 
where  (u+, v-)  and  (u-, v+)  are the buyer-optimal and the seller-optimal competitive 
equilibrium payoffs for  M(a#), respectively. If  (B+S+)    then there exist  bj(q)  
B#B+  and  sk(h)  S#S+  such that  (bj(q), sk(h))  blocks  (u, v; x). 
Our last lemma is an immediate consequence of Corollary 1 of Sotomayor (2007).  
Lemma 4.5. Let  (u , v ; x)  be a buyer-optimal competitive equilibrium outcome for  
M(a)  and  (u, v; x#)  the related competitive equilibrium outcome for  M(a#)  according 
to Lemma 4.2, where a# = (a, x). Then,  (u, v; x#)  is a buyer-optimal competitive 
equilibrium outcome for  M(a#). 
We can now proof Theorem 4.1. Denote  a’jk = max{a’jk  r’k, 0}  for all  (bj, sk)  
BxS  and let  (u , v ; x)  and  (u , v ; x)  be a buyer-optimal and seller-optimal 
competitive equilibrium outcomes  for  M(a). Suppose that  B’S’    and all agents 
in  B’S’  are strictly better off at  (u’, v’; x’)  than at any competitive equilibrium 
outcome for the original market  M(a). Then, Uj > u j  for all  bj  B’  and  Vk > v k  for 
all  sk  S’. 
We claim that  (U, V; x’)  is pairwise-feasible for  M(a). In fact, if  x’jk = 1  then 
 Ujk = u’jk  0  if  bj  B’; 
 Ujk = Uj > u j  0  if  bj  B’; 
 Vjk = v’jk  0  if  sk  S’; 
 Vjk = Vk > v k  0  if  sk  S’. 
Therefore, 0  Ujk + Vjk = (ajk  v’jk  r’k) + (v’jk + r’k  rk) = ajk  rk. Then,  ajk  rk  0  
which implies that  ajk = ajk – rk  and  Ujk + Vjk = ajk. Thus,  (U, V; x’)  is pairwise-
feasible for  M(a). Consequently,  (U, V; x’)  is feasible for  M(a). 
Let  a# = (a, x). Since  x’  is feasible for  M(a), the Key Lemma implies that there 
exists a feasible matching  x’#  for  M(a#)  related to  x’  such that if  x’jk = 1 then for 
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some  bj(q)  B#  and  sk(h)  S#  it happens that  x’#j(q)k(h) = 1  and  a#j(q)k(h) = ajk. Let  
(U#, V#, x’#)  be the feasible outcome in  M(a#)  related to  (U, V; x’)  according to 
Lemma 4.2. Also, let  (u #, v #; x#)  and  (u #, v #; x#)  be the competitive equilibrium 
outcomes related to  (u , v ; x)  and  (u , v ; x), respectively, according to Lemma 4.2. 
Now take  B+  and  S+  as defined in Lemma 4.4: 
 B+  {bj(q)  B#; U#j(q)) > u+j(q))}  and  S+  {sk(h)  S#; V#k(h) > v+k(h)}, 
where  (u+, v-)  and  (u-, v+)  are the buyer-optimal and the seller-optimal competitive 
equilibrium payoffs for  M(a#), respectively. 
Lemma 4.5 implies that  (u #, v #; x#) = (u+, v-; x#). By hypothesis,  Uj > u j  if         
bj  B’. Then, by identifying  bj  with his single copy  bj(1)  we can write  U#j = Uj > u j = 
u #j = u+j. Thus, if  B’    then  B’  B+  and so  B+S+  .  
If  B’ =   then  S’  . Since  t(sk) = 1  for all  sk  S’, it follows from Lemma 4.3 
that  v k = v+k  for all  sk  S’. Then,  S’  S+ and so  B+S+  . 
Therefore, we can apply Lemma 4.4 and there exists a pair  (bj(q), sk(h))  (B#B+) 
x (S#S+)  with  x’#j(q)k(h) = 0  such that  U#j(q)f(z) + V#g(y)k(h) < a#j(q)k(h)  where  {f(z)} = 
C(bj(q), x’#)  and  {g(y)} = C(sk(h), x’#). Since  bj  is not in  B’  and  sk  is not in  S’  we 
have that these agents did not misrepresent their valuations. Then, 
 U#j(q)f(z) = Ujf = u’jf, 
 V’#g(y)k(h) = Vgk = v’gk, and 
 ajk = a’jk. 
Given that either  a#j(q)k(h) = ajk  or  a#j(q)k(h) = 0, it follows that  a#j(q)k(h)  ajk = a’jk. Thus,  
0  mink{u’jk} + minj{v’jk}  u’jf + v’gk = U#j(q)f(z) + V#g(y)k(h) < a#j(q)k(h)  a’jk = a’jk  r’k, 
where the last equality follows from the fact that  a’jk > 0. But then  mink{u’jk} + 
minj{v’jk} < a’jk  r’k, which contradicts the fact that  (u’, v’; x’)  is a competitive 
equilibrium outcome for  M(a’, r’). 
 
Theorem 4.1 is a strong result in the sense that it provides information about any 
possible deviation by any group of agents with a quota of one. It leads to results on the 
incentives to manipulate of individual agents with a quota of one. It also allows us to 
derive results concerning the strategy-proofness of certain rules in many-to-one and 
one-to-many markets. 
Theorem 4.2 states the first consequence of Theorem 4.1: no seller with a quota of 
one can manipulate in  M(a, r)  any competitive equilibrium rule  (П, X)  that associates  
(a, r)  with a competitive equilibrium that gives the seller his optimal competitive 
equilibrium payoff. Similarly, no buyer with a quota of one can manipulate any 
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competitive equilibrium rule  (П, X)  that associates  (a, r)  with a competitive 
equilibrium that gives the buyer her optimal competitive equilibrium payoff. We note 
that it is not required that  (П, X)  is the seller-optimal, respectively the buyer-optimal, 
competitive equilibrium rule. 
 
Theorem 4.2. Let  M = M(a, r)  be a market and  (П, X)  a competitive equilibrium rule. 
(i) Consider  sk  S  with  t(sk) = 1. If the competitive equilibrium outcome 
associated with  (П(a, r), X(a, r))  gives  sk  his most-preferred competitive equilibrium 
payoff then  sk  cannot manipulate  (П, X). In particular,  sk  cannot manipulate the 
seller-optimal competitive equilibrium rule in  M. 
(ii) Consider  bj  B  with  t(bj) = 1. If the competitive equilibrium outcome 
associated with  (П(a, r), X(a, r))  gives  bj  her most-preferred competitive equilibrium 
payoff then  bj  cannot manipulate  (П, X). In particular,  bj  cannot manipulate the 
buyer-optimal competitive equilibrium rule in M. 
Proof. The proof follows directly from Theorem 4.1 by considering  S’ = {sk}  and       
B’ =   in (i), and S’ =   and  B’ = {bj}  in (ii).  
 
As a corollary of Theorem 4.2, no seller can manipulate the seller-optimal 
competitive equilibrium rule in many-to-one models, that is, in markets where all sellers 
have a quota of one. Similarly, in markets where all buyers have a quota of one, no 
buyer can manipulate the buyer-optimal competitive equilibrium rule. 
 
Corollary 4.1. (i) The seller-optimal competitive equilibrium rule is strategy-proof for 
the sellers in many-to-one buyer-seller markets. 
(ii) The buyer-optimal competitive equilibrium rule is strategy-proof for the buyers 
in one-to-many buyer-seller markets. 
 
Corollary 4.1 states that the competitive equilibrium rule which is optimal for one 
side of the market is individual strategy-proof for the agents in that side of the market. 
We can use Theorem 4.1 to go further and show that the rules are also group strategy-
proof.15 We now provide the precise definition of group strategy-proof for the sellers we 
are using in this paper. The definition of group strategy-proof for the buyers is similar. 
                                                            
15 Barberà, Berga, and Moreno (2016) show the equivalence between individual strategy-proof and group 
strategy-proof if the domain and the rule satisfy three properties. We cannot use their results because our 
framework does not satisfy the properties. 
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Definition 4.2. The rule  (П, X)  is manipulable in market  M(a, r)  by coalition  S’  S  
if there exists  r’  with  r’k = rk  for all  sk  SS’  such that all sellers in S’ strictly 
prefer  (П(a, r’), X(a, r’))  to  (П(a, r), X(a, r)). The rule   (П, X)  is group strategy-
proof for the sellers if it is not manipulable by any coalition  S’  S  in any  M(a, r). 
 
Theorem 4.3. (i) The seller-optimal competitive equilibrium rule is group strategy-
proof for the sellers in many-to-one buyer-seller markets. 
(ii) The buyer-optimal competitive equilibrium rule is group strategy-proof for the 
buyers in one-to-many buyer-seller markets. 
Proof. (i) Consider the many-to-one buyer-seller markets, where all sellers have a quota 
of one, and suppose by contradiction that the seller-optimal competitive equilibrium 
rule is not group strategy-proof for the sellers. Then, there exist a market  M(a, r), a 
coalition  S’  S,  and a vector of reported valuations  r’  with  r’k = rk  for all  sk  SS’  
such that sellers in  S’  can manipulate the rule in  M(a, r)  through  r’. Let  (u , v ; x)  
and  (u’, v’; x’)  be the seller-optimal competitive equilibrium outcomes for, 
respectively, markets  M(a, r)  and  M(a, r’); and let  (U, V; x’)  be the true outcome (for 
the sellers’ true preferences) under  (u’, v’; x’). For the coalition  S’  to manipulate the 
rule in  M(a, r)  through  r’, it is necessary that  j Vjk > j v jk  for all  sk  S’. However, 
this contradicts Theorem 4.1, which ensures the existence of at least one seller  sk  S’  
for whom  j v jk  j Vjk.  
(ii) The proof of (ii) is identical to that of (i).   
 
We close this section with a result that helps understand why a buyer with a quota 
of one never has an incentive to manipulate the buyer-optimal competitive equilibrium 
rule. The result is interesting in itself because it shows that the payoff of a buyer with a 
quota of one in the buyer-optimal competitive equilibrium rule is the difference between 
the “total value” of the market and the “total value” of the market without that buyer. 
This result implies that, at the buyer-optimal competitive equilibrium allocation, the 
price charged to a buyer with a quota of one does not depend on his statement of 
valuation. 
Theorem 4.4 requires some notation: For a market  M = M(a, r)  and an optimal 
matching  x  for  M, we set  V(a, r)  BxS a(a, r)jk xjk. Similarly, for the market  Mj  that 
involves the sets of agents  B–{bj}  and  S  with the same valuations as in M, and an 
optimal matching  x’  for  Mj, we set  Vj(a, r)  (B–{bj})xS a(a, r)jk x’jk. 
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Theorem 4.4. Let  (u , v ; x)  be a buyer-optimal competitive equilibrium outcome for           
M(a, r). Then,  u jk = V(a, r) – Vj(a, r), for all  bj  B  with  t(bj) = 1  and  sk  S  with  
xjk = 1. 
Proof. We use the following lemma, which is proven in the Appendix: 
Lemma 4.6. Let  (u ,  v ; x)  be a buyer-optimal competitive equilibrium outcome for      
M(a, r). Let  S’  S  with  S’    be such that  v k > 0  for all  sk  S’. Then,                   
(i) x(S–S’)  {b0}  and (ii) there is a pair  (bj, sk)  x(S–S’)xS’,  with  bj  b0  and          
xjk = 0,  and a seller  st  S–S’ with  xjt = 1, such that  u jt + v k = ajk – rk. 
Construct a graph whose vertices are  BS  with two types of arcs. If  xjk = 0  and  
mink{ u jk} + v k = ajk – rk  there is an arc from  sk  to  bj; if  xjk = 1  and  mink{ u jk} = u jk  
there is an arc from  bj  to  sk. Let  b1  B  such that  t(b1) = 1. Let  s1  S  such that       
x11 = 1. Then there is an arc from  b1  to  s1. We claim that there is an oriented path 
starting from  b1  and ending at a seller with a zero payoff (this seller might be  s0). To 
see this, suppose there is no such a path. Let  B’S’  be all the vertices that can be 
reached by a directed path starting from  b1. Then,  v k > 0  for all  sk  S’, so  s0  S’  
and  bj  b0  for all  bj  B’. Also, if  bj  B’  then  bj  fills her quota, since otherwise  
mink{ u jk} = u j0 = 0  and then there is an arc from  bj  to  s0, so  s0  S’, contradiction. 
By Lemma 4.1,  x(S–S’)  b0  and there is a pair  (bj, sk)  x(S–S’)xS’, with  bj  b0  and     
xjk = 0,  and  st  S–S’  with  xjt = 1, such that  u jt + v k = ajk – rk. But then  ajk – rk =    
u jt + v k  mink{u jk} + v k  ajk – rk, so  mink{u jk} + v k = ajk – rk  and there is an arc 
from  sk  to  bj, which implies that  bj B’,  and  u jt = mink{ u jk}, so there is an arc from  
bj  to  st,  which implies that  st  S’,  which contradicts the fact that  st  S–S’. 
Now consider a directed path  c  starting on  b1  and ending at a seller  sh  with a 
zero payoff (note that  sh  might be  s1). That is,  c = (b1, s1, b2, s2, b3, …,sh-1, bh, sh), 
where  xdd = 1,  mink{u dk} = u dd  and  mink{u dk} + v d–1 = add–1 – rd–1  for  d = 1,…,h. 
Take the matching  x’  in  M’ = M1(a, r)  that assigns  s1  to  {b2}(C(s1, x)–{b1}),  
s2  to {b3}(C(s2, x)–{b2}),…,  sh–1 to  {bh}(C(sh–1, x)–{bh–1})  and  sh  to                
{b0}(C(sh, x)–{bh})  if  sh  s0, and that otherwise agrees with  x  on every agent in   
B–{b1}S  that is not in the path. Define  u*  as follows: if  bd  c  and  bd  b1  then  
u*dd–1 = u dd  and  u*dk = u dk  if  sk  C(bd, x)–{sd}; if  bd  c. Thus,  u*dk = u dk  if       
sk  C(bd, x). From the construction of  x’  and  u*  it follows that  (u*, v ; x’)  is a 
competitive equilibrium outcome for  M’, which implies that  x’  is an optimal matching 
for  M’. Therefore,  bjb1,skS a(a, r)jk x’jk = V1(a, r). Then we can write  
bjb1,skS a(a, r)jk x’jk = bjB–{b1},skC(bj, x’)  u*jk + S v k = 
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bjB–{b1},skC(bj, x’) u jk + S v k = V(a, r) – u 11. 
Hence,  u 11 = V(a, r) – V1(a, r).  
 
According to Theorem 4.4, if  t(bj) = 1  and  xjk = 1  for  bj  B,  sk  S  and optimal 
matching  x, then 
v k = a(a, r)jk – u jk = a(a, r)jk – V(a, r) + Vj(a, r) = Vj(a, r) – B–{bj},S a(a, r)it xit. 
Therefore, buyer  bj  acquires object  sk  at the price 
pk = Vj(a, r) – B–{bj},S a(a, r)it xit + rk                                         (2) 
that is independent of any valuations of  bj. So, as in a Vickrey second-price auction for 
a single object, the price paid by a buyer with a quota of one is not determined by the 
valuation she states. Thus, she does not have an incentive to manipulate her valuation in 
the buyer-optimal competitive equilibrium rule. 
 
5. THE MANIPULABILITY THEOREMS 
In this section, we prove the two “folk theorems” stated in the introduction as 
corollaries of the General Manipulability Theorem. This theorem states that any agent 
who does not get her/his optimal equilibrium payoff in a market according to a 
competitive equilibrium rule can manipulate the rule. In these results, we analyze the 
agents’ equilibrium behavior when the buyer-seller market has several competitive price 
vectors.  
 
Theorem 5.1. (General Manipulability Theorem) Let  (П, X)  be any competitive 
equilibrium rule. Let  M  M(a, r)  be a market with more than one competitive price 
vector. Then any buyer (respectively, seller), whose vector of individual payoffs at  
(П(a, r); X(a, r))  is different from her (respectively, his) vector of individual payoffs 
under the buyer-optimal (respectively, seller-optimal) competitive equilibrium for  M  
can manipulate  (П, X)  in  M. 
Proof. We write as lemmas some results that are proven in Sotomayor (1992), and 
Sotomayor (1999), respectively. 
Lemma 5.1. If  (u, v; x)  is a competitive equilibrium outcome and  x’  is an optimal 
matching for M, then: 
(i) ujk = mink{ujk}  for all  bj  B  and  sk  C(bj, x)C(bj, x’). 
(ii) There exists a competitive equilibrium outcome  (u’, v; x’)  such that  mink{u’jk} 
= mink{ujk}  and  u’jk = ujk  for all  bj  B  and  sk  C(bj, x)C(bj, x’). 
(iii) (u, v; x’)  is also a competitive equilibrium outcome for M. 
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Lemma 5.2. If  (u, v; x)  is a competitive equilibrium outcome for M, then  x  is an 
optimal matching for M. 
We now prove the theorem. The competitive equilibrium outcome if agents select 
the profile  (a, r)  is  (u(a, r), П(a, r) – r; X(a, r)). Let  (u , p   r)  and  (u , p   r)  be 
the buyer-optimal and the seller-optimal competitive equilibrium payoffs for  M. 
Lemma 5.2 implies that  X(a, r)  is optimal and Lemma 5.1 (iii) implies that it is 
compatible with  (u , p   r)  and  (u , p   r). Furthermore,  p  ≤ p ≤ p , where  p  is the 
equilibrium price vector of the competitive equilibrium outcome selected by the rule.  
The case of a buyer: By hypothesis,  u(a, r)  u . Let  bj  be any buyer such that  
u(a, r)j  u j. Then, there is some  sl  C(bj, X(a, r))  such that  u jl > u(a, r)jl, which 
implies that the set  Aj  {sk  C(bj, X(a, r)); u jk > u(a, r)jk.}  is non-empty. (Note that  
u jk = u(a, r)jk. for all  sk  C(bj, X(a, r))Aj ). Clearly, for all  sk  Aj,  u jk > 0  and so  sk 
 s0. Furthermore, for every  sk  Aj, there is some positive  k  such that  u jk > u jk  k 
> u(a, r)jk  0, so  u jk  k > 0. 
Now define  a’  as follows:  a’it = ait  for all  (bi, st)  BxS  with  bi  bj;  a’jk = ajk  
(u jk  k)  for all  sk  Aj;  a’jk = ajk  u jk  for all  sk  C(bj, X(a, r))Aj; and  a’jk = 0  for 
all  sk  C(bj, X(a, r)).  It is a matter of verification that  a’it  0  for all  (bi, st)  BxS; 
hence,  a’  is well-defined. (It is enough to see that for all  sk  Aj,  a’jk = ajk  (u jk  k) 
> ajk  u jk = p k  0 and, for all  sk  C(bj, X(a, r))Aj,  a’jk = ajk  u jk = p k  0.) 
We show that  bj’s total true payoff at allocation  (П(a’, r), X(a’, r))  is strictly 
greater than at  (П(a, r); X(a, r)). First note that  p   is a competitive price vector for  
M(a’, r)  because  bj  still demands the set  C(bj, X(a, r)) at prices  p   in M(a’, r)  and 
the demand sets of the other buyers do not change. Then, according to Lemma 5.1 (iii),  
X(a, r)  is compatible with every competitive price vector for  M(a’, r); and by Lemma 
5.2  X(a’, r)  is compatible with  p . Denote  Bj  {sk; sk  C(bj, X(a, r))C(bj, X(a’, r))}  
and  B’j  {sk; sk  C(bj, X(a’, r))C(bj, X(a, r))}. Clearly,  |Bj| = |B’j|. Also, denote      
 j = min{u jk; sk  C(bj, X(a, r))}. By Lemma 5.1 (i), since  (u , p   r)  is compatible 
with  X(a, r)  and  X(a’, r), then   j = ajq – p q = a’jk  p k, for all  sq  Bj  and  sk  B’j. 
By definition,  a’jk = 0  for all  sk  B’j,  so   j = 0. Therefore, for all  sk  B’j  and       
sq  Bj,  Ujk(П(a’, r), X(a’, r); a, r) = ajk – Пk(a’, r)  ajk – a’jk = ajk  0 = j = u  jq  
u(a, r)jq. We conclude that 
Ujk(П(a’, r), X(a’, r); a, r)   u(a, r)jq,     sk  B’j  and  sq  Bj.           (3) 
Equation (3) states that bj’s utility derived from any new transactions (those under  
X(a’, r)  and not under  X(a, r)) is larger than the utility derived from any transactions 
that do not take place in the new situation. 
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Now observe that, at every equilibrium price  p’  for  M(a’, r), and for all  sk  Aj  
and  sq  C(bj, X(a, r)), we have  a’jk  p’k  = ( p k  p’k) + k > 0  p’q = a’jq  p’q, so  
a’jk  p’k > a’jq  p’q. This implies that every  sk  Aj  is matched to  bj  at any optimal 
matching for  M(a’, r), and in particular at  X(a’, r), from which it follows that               
Aj  C(bj, X(a, r))C(bj, X(a’, r)). Moreover, for all  sk  Aj  we have that                 
Ujk(П(a’, r), X(a’, r); a, r) = ajk  Пk(a’, r)  ajk  a’jk  = u jk  k > u(a, r)jk. Thus, 
  Ujk(П(a’, r), X(a’, r); a, r) > u(a, r)jk,    sk  Aj  C(bj, X(a, r))C(bj, X(a’, r))j  (4) 
Finally, for all  sk  C(bj, X(a, r))C(bj, X(a’, r))Aj  the following holds:                 
Ujk(П(a’, r), X(a’, r); a, r) = ajk  Пk(a’, r)  ajk  a’jk = u jk = u(a, r)jk. Therefore, 
  Ujk(П(a’, r), X(a’, r); a, r)  u(a, r)jk,    sk  C(bj, X(a’, r))C(bj, X(a’, r))Aj.  (5) 
The result follows from (3), (4), (5),  |B| = |B’|, and  Aj    (if  |B| = 0, the result 
also holds following (4) and (5)). Hence, the proof of this case is complete. 
The case of a seller: By hypothesis,  П(a, r)  p . Let  sk  be any seller for whom  
p k > Пk(a, r)  rk. Then  p k > rk,  so seller  sk  sells all his objects at  X(a, r). 
Furthermore, for some positive  ,  p k > p k   > Пk(a, r). 
Let  r’  be defined as follows:  r’t = rt  for all  st  sk  and  r’k = p k  . That is, 
under the profile  (a, r’),  sk  replaces his true valuation by  r’k, whereas the other players 
keep their valuations.  
First note that  p t  r’t  for all  st, which implies that  ( p , X(a, r))  is a feasible 
allocation for  M(a, r’). Now use the fact that  ( p , X(a, r))  is a competitive equilibrium 
in  M(a, r)  and that if  st  does not sell some objects at  X(a, r), then  st  sk, so                
p t = rt = r’t,  to obtain that  ( p , X(a, r))  is a competitive equilibrium for  M(a, r’).  As  
p k  r’k =  > 0, it follows that  sk  sells all his objects at any optimal matching for  
M(a, r’); in particular,  sk  sells all his objects at  X(a, r’).  Hence, the seller’s individual 
payoff from each object is 
Vk(П(a, r’), X(a, r’)) =  Пk(a, r’)  rk  r’k  rk = ( p k    rk) > Пk(a, r)  rk.  
 
Theorem 5.1 implies, in particular, that for any competitive equilibrium rule  (П, X)  
(not necessarily one of the optimal rules), if  (П(a, r), X(a, r))  is not the buyer- 
(respectively, seller-) optimal competitive equilibrium for market  M(a, r), then in the 
induced game  (П, X, a, r), truthful behavior is not a best response for at least one 
buyer (respectively, seller). In particular, 
 
Corollary 5.1. (Manipulability Theorem) Consider the buyer-optimal (respectively, 
seller-optimal) competitive equilibrium rule. Suppose that  M(a, r)  has more than one 
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vector of equilibrium prices. Then there is a seller (respectively, buyer) who can 
manipulate the rule via  M(a, r). 
 
Another immediate consequence of Theorem 5.1 is that for every market with more 
than one vector of competitive equilibrium prices, there is no competitive equilibrium 
rule such that the induced game gives every agent an incentive to play her/his sincere 
strategy. For the proof of the old impossibility result, Roth and Sotomayor (1990) 
constructed an example with one seller and  n > 1  buyers and showed that any 
competitive equilibrium rule can be manipulated by either the seller or one of the 
buyers. Corollary 5.2 strengthens this result by stating that every competitive 
equilibrium rule is manipulable in every market that has more than one vector of 
equilibrium prices. 
 
Corollary 5.2. (General Impossibility Theorem) Suppose that the market  M  has 
more than one vector of equilibrium prices. Then every competitive equilibrium rule is 
manipulable in  M. 
 
Corollaries 5.1 and 5.2 are valid under the assumption that the market has more 
than one vector of equilibrium price vectors. Sotomayor (2002) proved that this 
assumption holds in the one-to-one assignment game when there is only one optimal 
matching, which is generically the case. Furthermore, for any buyer-seller market, 
Sotomayor (1992) constructed a related assignment game via an appropriate definition 
of the matrix of valuations and she showed that there is a one-to-one correspondence 
between the set of competitive equilibrium allocations for the two models. This implies 
that, also for the buyer-seller market, there are always more than one competitive 
equililibrium price vectors, except in the ulikely situation where the market has several 
optimal matchings. Thefore, Corollaries 5.1 and 5.2 apply very generally.16 
We now use the manipulability and non-manipulability theorems to state the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for an agent with a quota of one to be able to 
manipulate a competitive equilibrium rule. 
 
                                                            
16 Consider a market with more than one optimal matching and only one competitive equilibrium price. 
Then, add any small   > 0 to the valuation of any of the buyers who is matched under an optimal 
matching  x. The maching  x  becomes the only optimal matching and, hence, the new market has more 
than one competitive equilibrium price. 
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Theorem 5.2. Let  M = M(a, r)  be a market and  (П, X)  a competitive equilibrium rule. 
Consider a buyer (respectively, seller) with a quota of one. Then, this agent cannot 
manipulate  (П, X)  in  M  if and only if  (П(a, r), X(a, r))  gives to the agent her 
(respectively, his) most preferred equilibrium payoff in  M. 
Proof. The first direction is immediate after Theorem 5.1. The other direction follows 
from Theorem 4.1, if the agent is a seller or Theorem 4.3, if the agent is a buyer.  
 
In particular, for the assignment game we can state the following corollary, which 
follows immediately after Theorem 5.2. 
 
Corollary 5.3. Suppose all agents have a quota of one. Let  M = M(a, r)  be a market 
and  (П, X)  a competitive equilibrium rule. Then, no buyer (respectively, seller) can 
manipulate  (П, X)  in  M  if and only if  (П(a, r), X(a, r))  is the buyer-optimal 
(respectively, seller-optimal) competitive equilibrium rule. 
 
Corollary 5.3 implies that when all agents have a quota of one, no agent can 
manipulate  (П, X) in  M(a, r)  if and only if  M(a, r) has only one equilibrium price 
vector. This is an interesting result that does not extend to one-to-many or many-to-one 
buyer-seller markets. For instance, if the number of identical objects owned by a seller 
is larger than the number of buyers, then the only equilibrium price of these objects is 
equal to the seller’s valuation. However, he often has an incentive to claim a higher 
valuation and obtain profits from a buyer whose valuation is higher that the seller’s true 
valuation. And similar examples can be constructed if a buyer is interested in acquiring 
more than one object. 
 
Finally, we state the necessary and sufficient condition for a competitive 
equilibrium rule to be strategy-proof for one side of the market in the assignment game. 
 
Corollary 5.4. Suppose all agents have a quota of one. The competitive equilibrium 
rule  (П, X)  is strategy proof by the buyers (respectively, sellers)  if and only if  (П, X)  
is the buyer-optimal (respectively, seller-optimal) competitive equilibrium rule. 
 
6. CONCLUSION AND EXTENSIONS 
We have analyzed sellers’ and buyers’ incentives if competitive equilibrium rules 
are applied. First, we have shown that although the Non-Manipulability Theorem for the 
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one-to-one buyer-seller market cannot be generalized for the many-to-many buyer-seller 
market, it can be extended to the model where all agents of one of the sides of the 
market have a quota of one. Second, we have proven a General Manipulability Theorem 
for the many-to-many buyer-seller market. The theorem states that if a competitive 
equilibrium rule does not yield the buyer- (seller-) optimal competitive equilibrium for 
an instance of the buyer-seller market, then any buyer (seller) who does not receive his 
(her) optimal equilibrium payoff has an incentive to misrepresent his (her) preferences. 
This theorem has two corollaries which are extensions of two important “folk theorems” 
for Shapley and Shubik’s (1972) one-to-one assignment game. Moreover, restricted to 
the assignment game, it is a sort of converse of the Non-Manipulability Theorem. 
We have studied a market that is more general than the classic assignment game. 
Therefore, in addition to the questions that we have addressed, our analysis opens the 
door to other interesting problems that are outside the scope of the current paper and left 
for future research. We briefly discuss some of the open questions. 
First, given that each agent has a quota larger than one in our market, a natural 
question is whether agents can manipulate the competitive rules with respect to the 
quotas, if the quotas are not public information. While we do not have general results, 
our intuition is that manipulating the quotas is often profitable for the agents. To support 
this intuition, we provide here examples where a buyer can manipulate through the 
quota the maximum or the minimum competitive equilibrium rule. Consider first the 
minimum competitive equilibrium rule. Take the market with  B = {b1, b2},  S = {s1, s2}, 
the buyers’ valuations are  a11 = 3,  a12 = 2,  a21 = a22 = 3, the sellers’ valuations are 
zero, the quota of  b1  is  2, and the quota of the rest of agents is 1. If all agents report 
their true valuations and quotas, the price of each object is 2. Buyer  b1  gets only the 
object of seller  s1  and obtains a total utility of  1 (buyer  b2  gets the object of seller  s2). 
However, if buyer  b1  misrepresents her quota and reports that it is  1, then she receives 
the same object as before but at the price of  0. That is, she is strictly better off by 
decreasing her quota. Consider now the maximum competitive equilibrium rule and a 
market where there is only one buyer with a quota of  2, and two sellers with an object 
each and a reservation value of zero. The buyer’s valuations are  a11 = 3  and  a12 = 2. 
The maximum competitive equilibrium prices for the objects are  3  and  2  and the 
buyer gets a zero payoff. However, the buyer has an incentive to report a quota of  1, 
since she would get a payoff of  2  in the new market by buying the first object at a price 
of  1. 
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Second, we have studied a market where the value of an object for a buyer does not 
depend on the other objects that she acquires or on the other buyers acquiring a similar 
object. This condition implies, in particular, that the preferences of the buyers fulfill the 
“gross substitutes condition.” As Kelso and Crawford (1982) emphasized, competitive 
equilibria often do not exist when objects can be complementary from the buyers’ point 
of view. The analysis of competitive equilibria and the manipulability of competitive 
equilibrium rules in markets where buyers have more general preferences are interesting 
and very challenging problems. 
Finally, we have assumed that each buyer can only obtain one object of the same 
seller. The model in which a buyer can obtain more than one object of the same seller is 
treated in Sotomayor (2008) and Jaume, Massó, and Neme (2012).17 In this situation, it 
is easy to construct an example where buyers cannot manipulate the minimum 
competitive equilibrium but they can manipulate the maximum competitive equilibrium. 
Consider only one buyer with a quota of  5  and two sellers,  s1  with a quota of  4  and  
s2  with a quota of  1. The buyer valuations are a11 = a12 = 3. In this market, the price of 
each object is  3  at the maximum competitive equilibrium. Clearly, the buyer has an 
incentive to manipulate her valuations by reporting  a’11 = a’12 = 0. However, general 
theorems about the manipulability of the rules in these markets cannot be proved with 
the theory developed in the present paper. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Proof of Lemma 4.2. (i) Suppose that  (u’, v’; x’)  is feasible for  M(a). If  x’#j(q)k(h) = 1  
then  x’jk = 1  and  a#j(q)k(h) = ajk  by the Key Lemma. Then,  u’#j(q) + v’#k(h) = u’jk + v’jk = 
ajk = a#j(q)k(h). By definition,  u’#j(q)  0  and  v’#k(h)  0. Hence, (u’#, v’#; x’#)  is a 
pairwise-feasible outcome for  M(a#), so it is feasible for  M(a#).  
In the other direction, suppose that (u’#, v’#; x’#)  is feasible for  M(a#). If  x’jk = 1, 
then  x’#j(q)k(h) = 1  for some pair  (bj(q), sk(h))  B#xS#  by the Key Lemma and  a#j(q)k(h) 
= ajk  by the definition of  a#. Then  u’jk + v’jk = u’#j(q) + v’#k(h)  = a#j(q)k(h) = ajk. By 
definition,  u’jk  0  and  v’jk  0. Hence,  (u’, v’; x’)  is a pairwise-feasible outcome for  
M(a), so it is feasible for  M(a).  
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(ii) Suppose that  (u’, v’; x’)  is a competitive equilibrium for  M(a). Then, x’#  is an 
optimal matching for  M(a#). Also,  (u’, v’; x)  is a competitive equilibrium for  M(a)  
(see Theorem 1 of Sotomayor, 1999). Moreover, if  x#j(q)k(h) = 0, we have either (1)  xjk = 
0, in which case  mink{u’jk} + minj{v’jk} ajk  by Proposition 2.1, which implies  u’#j(q) 
+ v’#k(h)  mink{u’jk} + minj{v’jk} ajk = a#j(q)k(h), where the last equality follows from 
the definition of  a#; or (2)  xjk = 1, in which case  u’#j(q) + v’#k(h)  0 = a#j(q)k(h). In either 
case, we obtain that  (u’#, v’#; x#)  is a competitive equilibrium for  M(a#). Then, by the 
optimality of  x’#,  (u’#, v’#; x’#)  is also a competitive equilibrium for  M(a#).  
(iii) Suppose that  (u’#, v’#; x’#)  is a competitive equilibrium for  M(a#). Then 
(u’#, v’#; x#)  is also a competitive equilibrium for  M(a#). Moreover,  x’#  is an optimal 
matching for  M(a#), which implies that  x’  is an optimal matching for  M(a). Then, if  
xjk = 0  we have that x#j(q)k(h) = 0  and  a#j(q)k(h) = ajk  for all  bj(q)  B#  and all  sk(h)  S#. 
The definition of  (u’#, v’#)  implies that  mink{u’jk} = u’#j(q)  for some  bj(q)  B#  and  
minj{v’jk} = v’#k(h)  for some  sk(h)  S#. Hence,  mink{u’jk} + minj{v’jk} = u’#j(q) + v’#k(h) 
 a#j(q)k(h) = ajk. By hypothesis,  v’ik = minj{v’jk}  holds for all  bi   C(sk, x). Then, 
Proposition 2.1 implies that  (u’, v’; x)  is a competitive equilibrium outcome for  M(a). 
Since  x’  is optimal for  M(a),  Theorem 1 of Sotomayor (1999) implies that  (u’, v’; x’)  
is a competitive equilibrium outcome for  M(a).    
 
Proof of Lemma 4.3. Define the outcome  (u’, v’; x#)  for  M(a#)  as follows:  v’k(z)  
min{vk(1),…, vk(t(sk))}  for all  sk(z)  S#  and the payoff vector  u’  is defined pairwise-
feasibly. We claim that  (u’, v’; x#)  is a competitive equilibrium outcome for  M(a#). 
First, it is clear that  (u’, v’; x#)  is feasible for  M(a#)  by definition. Second,  u’j(q)  
uj(q)  for all  bj(q)  B#  because  v’k(z)  vk(z)  for all  sk(z)  S#. Consider now a pair      
(bj(q), sk(h))  with  x#j(q)k(h) = 0  and  let  l  t(sk)  such that  vk(l) = min{vk(1),…, vk(t(sk))}. 
There are two cases.  
Case 1. xjk = 0, in which case  a#j(q)k(h) = a#j(q)k(l). It follows that  u’j(q) + v’k(h)  uj(q) + vk(l) 
 a#j(q)k(l) = a#j(q)k(h), where we use Proposition 2.1 in the last inequality. 
Case 2. xjk = 1, in which case  a#j(q)k(h) = 0. It follows that  u’j(q) + v’k(h)  uj(q) + vk(l)  0 = 
a#j(q)k(h). 
Given that  u’j(q) + v’k(h)  a#j(q)k(h)  for all  (bj(q), sk(h))  with  x#j(q)k(h) = 0, the result 
that (u’, v’; x#)  is a competitive equilibrium outcome for  M(a#)  follows from 
Proposition 2.1. 
We now use Lemma 4.2 to obtain that the outcome  (u”, v”; x)  related to            
(u’, v’; x#)  is competitive for  M(a). Then, by the optimality for  S  of  (u , v )  in  M(a),   
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vk”  v k  for all  sk  with a quota of one.   (A1) 
On the other hand, let  (u ’, v ’; x#)  be the competitive equilibrium outcome related 
to  (u , v ; x)  according to Lemma 4.2. By the optimality for  S#  of  (u, v; x#)  in  M(a#)  
we have that  v ’k(h)  vk(h)  for all  sk(h)  S#. We also have that  vk = v’k  for all  sk  with  
t(sk) = 1. Therefore, if  t(sk) = 1  we must have that   
v k = v ’k  vk = v’k = v”k.     (A2) 
From (A1) and (A2) we obtain that  v k = v”k  so the inequality in (A2) is in fact an 
equality and so  v k = vk  for all  sk  with a quota of one, which concludes the proof.   
 
Proof of Lemma 4.4. If  B+  , Lemma 9.20 of Roth and Sotomayor (1990), due to 
Demange and Gale (1985), implies that there exist  bj(q)  B#B+ and sk(h)  x(B+)  such 
that  (bj(q), sk(h))  blocks  (u, v; x). Since  bj(q)  B#B+, uj(q)  u+j(q). Also, since  sk(h)  
x(B+)  there exists some  bl(m)  B+  such that  xl(m)k(h) = 1. Then,  ul(m) > u+l(m)  so  vk(h)  
v-k(h)  v+k(h)  by the competitiveness of  (u+, v-). Therefore,  sk(h)  S+. 
 
Proof of Lemma 4.6. (i) Suppose by contradiction that  x(S–S’) = {b0}. Given that       
s0  S–S’,  x(S–S’) = {b0}  implies that if  sk  S’  and  xjk = 1, then  bj  b0. Moreover, 
every  bj  b0  fills her quota and does that with sellers in  S’. That is,  x(S’) = B–{b0}. 
Then take   > 0  such that  v k –  > 0  for all  sk  S’  and define  (u, v; x)  as follows: 
 vk = v k –   if  sk  S’  and  vk = v k ,  otherwise; 
 ujk = u jk +   if  bj  x(S’) = B–{b0}  and  xjk = 1; 
 u0k = u 0k = 0  if  x0k = 1. 
We claim that  (u, v; x)  is a competitive equilibrium outcome for M(a, r). In fact, 
the feasibility of  (u, v; x)  and condition (iii) of Proposition 2.1 are clearly satisfied. To 
show that mink{ujk} + vk  ajk – rk  for all  (bj, sk)  BxS, use the construction of  (u, v; x)  
and the fact that  (u , v ; x)  is a competitive equilibrium outcome for the case when                
bj  b0. When  bj = b0, it is enough to verify the inequality when  sk  S’. In this case, we 
have that  mink{ujk} + vk = v k –  > 0 = a0k – rk = ajk – rk. However,  vk < v k  for all          
sk  S’, and  S’  , which contradicts the fact that  (u , v ; x)  is a seller-optimal 
competitive equilibrium outcome for  M(a, r).  Hence,  x(S–S’)  b0. 
(ii) Arguing by contradiction, suppose  u jt + v k > ajk – rk  for all  (bj, sk)  x(S–S’)xS’ 
with  bj  b0  and  xjk = 0, and for all  st  S–S’  with  xjt = 1. Then there exists   > 0  
such that  v k –  > 0  for all  sk  S’  and also such that for all  (bj, sk)  x(S–S’)xS’, 
with  bj  b0  and  xjk = 0, and for all  st  S–S’  with  xjt = 1, the parameter    satisfies 
u jt + v k –  > ajk – rk .                     (A1) 
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Now, define  (u’, v’; x)  as follows: 
v’k = v k –   if  sk  S’  and  v’k = v k ,  otherwise; 
u’jk = u jk +   if  sk  S’  and  xjk = 1; 
u’jk = u jk  if  sk  S–S’  and  xjk = 1. 
We claim that  (u’, v’; x)  is a competitive equilibrium outcome. The argument is 
similar to the one used in part (i). We only need to check that  mink{u’jk} + v’k  ajk – rk  
for all  sk  S’  and  xjk = 0. Then, let  (bj, sk)  BxS’, with  xjk = 0  and let                            
mink{u’jk} = u’jt, for some  st  C(bj, x). If  st  S’  then the result follows from the 
competitiveness of  ( u , v ; x); if  st  S–S’  the result follows from (A1).  
However,  v’k < v k  for all  sk  S’, and  S’  , which contradicts that  (u , v ; x)  is 
buyer-optimal for  M(a, r).  
